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On January 13, 1995 when few experts could fully understand the newly
established dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO, Singapore
submitted the consultation request for a dispute settlement against
Malaysia concerning import prohibitions on polyethylene and polypropy-
lene.1It was the very beginning of the WTO dispute settlement system that
is the essence of the current world trading system.2 This case was subse-
quently resolved with a mutually agreed solution and so notiﬁed on July
19, 1995.
This birth history of the WTO dispute settlement showed the interesting
fact that it was East Asian members that opened Pandora’s box for the new
era in the world trading system. Since then, East Asian members have
actively participated in utilizing and augmenting the WTO dispute settle-
ment system. These experiences and lessons thereof are brieﬂy discussed in
the following.
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1. WTO, Malaysia—Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and Polypropylene (WT/
DS1/1).
2. During the very ﬁrst month of the WTO, only two consultation requests were submitted
to the WTO DSB. The other case was US—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline (DS2) that resulted in the ﬁrst panel/Appellate Body proceedings.9.2 General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) 
Dispute Settlements in East Asia
9.2.1 GATT/WTO Accession
Among East Asian members, China was, in fact, one of the drafting
members of the GATT and joined the GATT in 1948. Then Indonesia
joined the GATT, not by accepting the Protocol of Provisional Applica-
tion, but instead by succeeding contracting party status under Article
XXVI:5(c) in 1950.3
Japan acceded to GATT on September 1955 and, at the time of accession,
fourteen contracting parties invoked Article XXXV. Subsequently, thirty-
three contracting parties invoked Article XXXV by succession in respect to
Japan when they became liberated from Belgium, France, and the United
Kingdom. Three other contracting parties also invoked Article XXXV
when they later joined the GATT. All these Article XXXV invocations were
later gradually disinvoked to normalize the GATT relationship with Japan
(WTO 1995, 1034–36). After the Tokyo Round negotiation, Japan accepted
all nine new agreements, often termed as “Side Codes.” (See table 9.1.)
The Korean government ﬁrst sought to join the GATT in 1950, when it
eagerly tried to be recognized as an independent state in the international
community after liberation from Japan. At that time, the Korean govern-
ment delegation sent to Torquay, England ﬁnished the GATT accession ne-
gotiation and signed the relevant documents.4 This ﬁrst attempt, however,
failed when the Korean government could not complete the requisite do-
mestic ratiﬁcation procedures due to the Korean War during 1950 to 1953.5
The Korean government resumed its eﬀort to accede to the GATT in 1965
when it vigorously pursued export promotion as the primary element of
economic development policies. After extensive internal discussion on po-
tential economic beneﬁts and costs, the Korean government ﬁnally submit-
ted its accession application to the GATT secretariat on May 20, 1966 and
conducted the tariﬀ negotiations with twelve contracting parties from
September to December 2, 1966.6 Korea oﬃcially acceded to the GATT in
1967, in accordance with Article XXXIII of the GATT.7On the other hand,
Korea invoked Article XXXV for nonapplication of GATT with respect to
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3. Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Macao also acceded to the GATT under Article
XXVI:5(c). See WTO (1995, 1145–46).
4. See GATT (1952) Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (hereinafter BISD), vol. 2,
33–34. At that meeting, Austria, Peru, the Philippines, and Turkey also ﬁnished the accession
negotiation. While Austria, Peru, and Turkey formally became contracting parties in 1951,
the Philippines formally joined the GATT on December 27, 1979.
5. See Tae-Hyuk Hahm (1994, at 5).
6. The Working Party for Korea’s accession included fourteen contracting parties. See
Hahm (1994, 23).
7. See GATT (1968, 60), Korea—Accession under Article XXXIII: Decision of 2 March
1967, BISD, no. 15.WTO Dispute Settlements in East Asia 289
Table 9.1 GATT/WTO Accession for East Asian members: As of August 2003
GATT/WTO 
Country Accession date GPAa TCAb ITAc BTd
China Dec. 11, 2001 N Observer Y N
Taiwan Jan. 1, 2002 Negotiating Accession Y Y N
Hong Kong, China April 23, 1986 Jan. 1, 1997 N Y Y
Indonesia Feb. 24, 1950 N Observer Y Y
Japan Sep. 10, 1955 Jan. 1, 1996 Y Y Y
KoreaA pril 14, 1967 Jan. 1, 1997 Observer Y Y
Macao, China Jan. 11, 1991 N Y Y N
Malaysia Oct. 24, 1957 N N Y Y
The Philippines Dec. 27, 1979 N N Y Y
Singapore Aug. 20, 1973 Jan. 1, 1996 Observer Y Y
Thailand Nov. 20, 1982 N N Y Y
aPlurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement.
bPlurilateral Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (WT/L/434, dated November 26, 2001).
cMinisterial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products.
dBasic Telecommunication Negotiations (annexed to the fourth protocol of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services).
Cuba,8 Czechoslovakia,9 Poland,10 and Yugoslavia.11 These Article XXXV
invocations were all simultaneously withdrawn in September 1971.12
Korea began its formal participation as a contracting party at the Tokyo
Round of the multilateral trade negotiation, although it was merely as a mi-
nor player (Kim, forthcoming). Subsequently, Korea joined the four Side
Codes: Subsidies Code,13 Standards Code,14 Customs Valuation Code,15
and Antidumping Code.16 Korea had never joined the sectoral agreements
8. See GATT, L/2783 (1967).
9. See GATT, L/2783 (1967).
10. See GATT, L/2874 (1967).
11. See GATT, L/2783 (1967).
12. See GATT, L/3580 (1971). See also WTO (1995, 1034–36). On the other hand, it is noted
that ﬁfty contracting parties invoked Article XXXV in respect to Japan at its accession in
1955. See GATT, L/2783 (1967).
13. This is the agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and
XXIII. In Korea, it was signed on June 10, 1980 and entered into force on July 10, 1980 as
Treaty no. 709. See Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Compilation of Multilateral Treaties,vol. 5 (in
Korean).
14. This is the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. In Korea, it was signed on Sep-
tember 3, 1980 and entered into force on October 2, 1980 as Treaty no. 715. See Ministry of
Foreign Aﬀairs.
15. This is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII. The Customs Valuation Code
entered into force on January 1, 1981, while the other three codes entered into force on Jan-
uary 1, 1980. See GATT (1982, 40), BISD, no. 28. In Korea, it was entered into force on Jan-
uary 6, 1981 as Treaty no. 729. See Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs.
16. This is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI. Korea accepted the An-
tidumping Code on February 24, 1986, and the code entered into force for Korea on March
26, 1986 as Treaty no. 877. See GATT (1987, 207), BISD, no. 33. See also Ministry of Foreign
Aﬀairs, Compilation of Multilateral Treaties, vol. 8 (in Korean).on bovine meat, dairy products, and civil aircraft nor the Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures as a plurilateral agreement. Korea joined the
Agreement on Government Procurement during the Uruguay Round and
implemented it only from January 1, 1997, while all other signatories ex-
cept for Hong Kong applied it from January 1, 1996.17
China was one of twenty-three original GATT contracting parties and
signed the Protocol of Provisional Application on April 21, 1947. Subse-
quently, China participated in the ﬁrst two rounds of multilateral trade
negotiation, the Geneva and Annecy Rounds. After the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) was founded on October 1, 1949, the Taiwan authorities
withdrew from the GATT in the name of the Republic of China. This with-
drawal came into eﬀect on May 5, 1950. China tried to resume its GATT
relations after it secured a seat at the United Nations (UN) in October
1971. In January 1984, the PRC became a member of the GATT Commit-
tee on Textiles and in November 1984, an observer to the GATT Council
and other subsidiary meetings.
On July 10, 1986, the PRC oﬃcially applied to resume China’s status as
a contracting party and the Working Party on China’s accession was es-
tablished on March 4, 1987.18 The Working Party included sixty-eight
Members to be the biggest working party for GATT/WTO accession.
Since then, China sent a delegation to the Uruguay Round negotiations
and ﬁnally the head of the Chinese delegation signed the ﬁnal documents
of the Uruguay Round along with the other 125 member countries (Yang
and Jin 2001). Therefore, the Uruguay Round agreements are supposed to
apply to China once it becomes a formal member of the WTO. For bilat-
eral negotiations concerning China’s accession, thirty-seven members re-
quested negotiations with China.19 China ﬁnally ﬁnished its accession ne-
gotiations with all those members and signed the membership agreement
on November 11, 2001.20 Having completed the domestic ratiﬁcation pro-
cedure for its WTO accession on August 25, 2000, China became a formal
member on December 11, 2001, thirty days after the accession approval.
China committed, upon accession, to comply with the Trade-Related In-
vestment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement, without recourse to the provi-
sions of Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement and to eliminate all subsidy
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17. See WTO, Agreement on Government Procurement, Article XXIV:3. Hong Kong also
had one more year for implementation to apply from January 1, 1997.
18. More technically, China’s application for accession was not to reenter the GATT but to
resume a contracting party status of the GATT. The chairman of the Working Party was 
Mr. P.-L. Girard from Switzerland. See GATT, C/M/207.
19. These countries include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, EC, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Kirghizstan, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the
Philippines, Poland, Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand,
Turkey, Uruguay, the United States, and Venezuela.
20. The Chinese membership agreement runs to 1,500 pages and weighs 13 kilograms. See
http://www.chil.wto-ministerial.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_11nov_e.htm.programs falling within the scope of Article 3 of the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). In addition, China shall
not maintain or introduce any export subsidies on agricultural products.
Therefore, China did not get any special waiver period as a developing
country. Moreover, the importing WTO member may use a methodology
that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in
China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that mar-
ket economy conditions prevail in the industry, producing the like product
with regard to manufacture, production, and sale of that product. Once
China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO mem-
ber, that it is a market economy, the preceding provision shall be termi-
nated provided that the importing member’s national law contains market
economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of
nonmarket economy shall expire ﬁfteen years after the date of accession.
In addition, China agreed to accept the so-called transitional product-
speciﬁc safeguard mechanism against its products in cases where products
of Chinese origin are being imported into the territory of any WTO mem-
ber in such increased quantities or under such conditions as to cause or
threaten to cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like or di-
rectly competitive products. The accession protocol of China deﬁnes that
“market disruption shall exist whenever imports of an article, like or di-
rectly competitive with an article produced by the domestic industry, are
increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a signiﬁcant
cause of material injury, or threat of material injury to the domestic indus-
try.”21 In other words, this special safeguard mechanism eﬀectively lowers
the threshold for invoking safeguard actions from serious injury to ma-
terial injury that is normally required for unfair trade cases such as an-
tidumping or countervailing measures. This special safeguard mechanism
shall be terminated twelve years after the date of accession.
9.2.2 Limited Experience Except for Japan
During the GATT period, formal trade dispute settlements were not fre-
quently utilized by East Asian countries except for Japan. (See tables 9.2
and 9.3.) Thailand had disputes concerning tobacco with the United States
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21. See WTO, WT/ACC/CHN/49, paragraph 16.4.
Table 9.2 GATT disputes involving Thailand
As complainant
United States—Measures aﬀecting the importation and 
internal sale of tobacco DS44/R
As respondent
Thailand—Restrictions on importation of and internal 
taxes on cigarettes United States BISD 37S/200as both a complainant and a respondent. Korea was challenged twice at the
GATT dispute settlement system and brought a complaint against the Eu-
ropean Community (EC). Other East Asian countries were not visible, at
least in terms of the GATT dispute settlement system. It is partly because
those countries acceded to the GATT relatively late and partly because
their trade volumes were not signiﬁcant during the GATT period.
Japan was, however, one of the most frequent targets for complaints in
the GATT dispute settlement system.22While it brought twelve complaints
on eleven distinct matters, mostly against the United States and the EC,
Japan was challenged in twenty-eight cases on twenty-three distinct mat-
ters. Among twenty-eight cases challenged, thirteen cases went to a panel,
and only six cases ended with substantive panel reports. Twelve complaints
by Japan resulted in only two panel decisions. Under the GATT system, the
EC and the United States were the major disputing parties. It is noted that
whereas Japan stood against the EC in ﬁve cases as both complainant and
respondent, the United States challenged Japan in twelve cases and was
challenged by Japan in four cases. In terms of a subject matter, antidump-
ing measures by trading partners were the primary target of Japan’s com-
plaints. To the contrary, import restrictive measures by Japan concerning
agricultural, textile, and leather products were major issues disputed by
other GATT contracting parties. (See tables 9.4 and 9.5.)
As indicated previously, Japan rarely used the GATT dispute settlement
system as part of its trade diplomacy, while Japan was frequently targeted
in dispute settlement cases (Jackson 1999). During the GATT regime,
Japan was considered one of those countries that leaned toward pragma-
tism as opposed to other countries, among which was notably the United
States, which favored legalism (Iwasawa 2000, supranote 26). Japan tried
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22. The United States and the EC had been the two most frequently challenged countries
under the GATT dispute settlement systems. The next frequent target was Japan. See Robert
Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law, 590–608 (1993).
Table 9.3 GATT disputes involving Korea
As complainant
EC—Article XIX action on imports into Settled Cases  under 
the U.K. of television sets from Korea Article XXIII
As respondent
Korea—Restrictions on imports of beef Australia,  BISD 36S/202, Cases under 
New Zealand,  36S/234, 36S/268  Article XXIII
United States (adopted on 
Nov. 7, 1989)
Korea-Antidumping duties on imports  United States BISD 40S/205  Case under the 
of polyacetal resins from the United  (adopted on  Tokyo Round anti-
States April 27, 1993) dumping codeWTO Dispute Settlements in East Asia 293
Table 9.4 GATT cases: Japan as a complainant
Case name Defendant Date
Italian Import Restrictions—Consultations under Art. XXII.1 Italy July 1960
United States—Suspension of Customs Liquidation (Zenith Case)—
referred to a Working Party United States May 1977
United States—Tariﬀ Measures on Light Truck Cab Chassis—
consultations under Art. XXII.1 and XXIII.1 United States May 1980
Austria—Quantitative Restrictions on Import of Japanese Video Tape 
Recorders—consultations under Art. XXII.1 Austria Feb. 1981
EC—Import Restrictive Measures on Video Tape Recorders—
consultation under Art. XXIII.1 EC Dec. 1982
United States—Unilateral Measures on Imports of Certain Japanese 
Products—consultation under Art. XXIII.1 United States April 1987
EC—Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components—dispute 
settlement under the Antidumping Agreement EC July 1988
EC—Regulation on Import of Parts and Components EC Aug. 1988
Korea—Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Imports of Polyacetala Korea Sept. 1991
EC—Treatment of Antidumping Duties as a Cost in Refund 
Proceedings EC April 1992
EC—Antidumping Proceedings in the European Community on Audio 
Tapes and Cassettes Originating in Japan EC May 1992
United States—Provisional Antidumping Measures against Imports of 
Certain Steel Flat Products—consultations under the Antidumping 
Agreement United States June 1993
Source: Yuji Iwasawa (2000, 486–88).
Notes: Twelve cases on eleven distinct matters; two cases (in italics) went to a panel.
aThis case does not seem to reach to the formal dispute settlement procedure as there is no oﬃcial case
number attached to this case. The Committee on Antidumping Practices simply noted that it was “in-
formed of requests by Japan for bilateral consultations under Article 15:2 with Korea on anti-dumping
duties on polyacetal resins.” BISD 38S/85 (1992).
to resolve a dispute with mutual agreement rather than actually litigate
merits of cases through the dispute settlement system. Whereas a sizable
number of cases were ﬁled against Japan under the GATT dispute settle-
ment system, Japan seldom brought a dispute to the GATT until the late
1980s. Moreover, Japan continued its eﬀorts to settle the dispute amicably
by agreement between the parties even after a case was referred to a panel.
Thus, among twenty-eight cases brought against Japan in the GATT, only
six cases ended with a substantive report by the panel. Only two out of the
twelve cases Japan brought to the GATT dispute settlement system con-
cluded with panel decisions.
Japan was not very eager to bring a dispute to the GATT so as to assert
its rights under the GATT. Japan generally tried to avoid having recourse
to more confrontational panel procedures. It was not until 1988 that Japan
requested the establishment of a panel for the ﬁrst time, thirty-three years
after its accession to the GATT. But after the EC—Regulation on Import of
Parts and Components case ended with favorable decisions to Japan, theTable 9.5 GATT cases: Japan as a defendant
Case name Complainant Date
Uruguayan Recourse to Art. XXIIIa Uruguay Nov. 1961
Japan-Tariﬀ Treatment of Sea Water Magnesite—consultations under  United States Jan. 1964
Art. XXII.1
Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Beef and Veal—consultation under  Australia Nov. 1974
Art. XXII.1
Japan—Measures on Import of Thrown Silk Yarn United States July 1978
Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather United States July 1978
Japan’s Measures on Imports of Leather Canada Oct. 1979
Japan—Restraints on Imports of Manufactured Tobacco from  United States Nov. 1979
United States
Japan—Measures on Imports of Leather India April 1980
Japanese Measures on Edible Fats—consultation under Art. XXII.1 New Zealand Oct. 1980
Japan—Certiﬁcation Procedures for Metal Softball Bats—Dispute  United States Sept. 1982
under the Standard Agreement
Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather United States Jan. 1983
Japan—Nulliﬁcation and Impairment of Beneﬁts and Impediment to  EC April 1983
the Attainment of GATT Objectives
Japan—Measures Aﬀecting the World Market for Copper Ores and  EC March 1984
Concentrates—consultations under Art. XXII.2 and good oﬃces of 
the Director-General
Japan—Single Tendering Procedures—consultations under the  United States Nov. 1984
Government Procurement Agreement
Japan—Quantitative Restrictions or Measures Having Equivalent  Chile Nov. 1984
Eﬀect Applied on Imports of Various Product—consultations under 
Art. XXII.1
Japan—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Leather Footwear United States March 1985
Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products United States July 1986
Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Herring, Pollack, and Surimi United States Oct. 1986
Japan—Customs Duties, Taxes, and Labeling Practices on Imported  EC July 1986
Wines and Alcoholic Beverages
Japan—Trade in Semiconductors EC Feb. 1987
Japan—Tariﬀ on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber Canada Nov. 1987
Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Beef and Citrus Products United States March 1988
Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Beef Australia April 1988
Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Beef New Zealand May 1988
Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products United States Feb. 1991
Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products Australia April 1991
Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products New Zealand Aug. 1992
Japan—Measures Aﬀecting Imports of Certain Telecommunications  EC Oct. 1994
Equipment
Notes:Twenty-eight cases on twenty-three distinct matters; thirteen cases (in italics) went to a panel; six
cases (in bold) ended with substantive reports by panels.
aUruguayan submissions were related to the ﬁfteen contracting parties, namely, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.Japanese government changed its attitude and has pursued more rule-
oriented trade policies since.23
9.3 WTO Dispute Settlements in East Asia
9.3.1 Overall Statistics
The Uruguay Round negotiation crucially augmented the GATT dis-
pute settlement system,24 rectifying several systemic problems by institut-
ing, inter alia, a quasi-automatic adoption mechanism, an appellate pro-
cedure, and a single uniﬁed system.25 As mostly concurred, the WTO
dispute settlement system has been working very eﬀectively in resolution
of trade disputes and to become the core part of the WTO system. As of
December 31, 2003, 305 cases have been brought to the WTO dispute
settlement body. Among them, 76 panel and Appellate Body reports were
adopted, while 43 cases were resolved with mutually agreed solutions, and
24 cases were settled or inactive.26One provisional empirical observation is
that trade tends to increase with more trade disputes.27This fact deserves a
more rigorous empirical analysis, especially in respect to the simultaneity
problem. (See table 9.6.)
The yearly trend of WTO dispute cases ﬁled up to the end of 2003 is
shown in ﬁgure 9.1. As illustrated in ﬁgure 9.1, WTO dispute cases were
rapidly increased during the ﬁrst three years and then averaged around
thirty cases per year. Dispute cases concerning East Asian countries, how-
ever, show the interesting feature that the role of East Asian countries as
complainants have increased recently compared to that as respondents. It
is also noted that WTO disputes among East Asian countries are still rare.
Instead, their complaints are predominantly focused on the United States,
while the United States is also the most frequent complainant against the
East Asian countries.28 To the contrary, the EC has hardly been the target
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23. Regarding the historical importance of EC—Regulation on Import of Parts and Com-
ponents case in Japan, see (Iwasawa, 477).
24. After the Tokyo round negotiation that established nine additional so-called Side
Codes, the GATT dispute settlement system suﬀered particularly from forum shopping prob-
lems. See, generally, Jackson (1990).
25. For detailed discussion on the WTO dispute settlement system, see, generally, Jackson
(1998), Palmeter and Mavroidis (1999), U. E. Petersmann (1997), Special Issue, WTO Dispute
Settlement System, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 1, no. 2 (1998); and Waincy-
mer (2002).
26. See WTO, WT/DS/OV/19 (dated 6 February 2004). See also Leitner and Lester (2004).
27. Professor Andrew Rose found this result using standard bilateral gravity models of
trade. His provisional ﬁnding includes that this result does not depend on which country ﬁles
against which country. I am very grateful for his sharing of this interesting empirical result.
More rigorous econometric studies on this point will be presented by us.
28. As of December 31, 2003, 18 out of the total 42 complaints by the East Asian countries
were against the United States. On the other hand, 14 complaints were ﬁled by the United
States against the East Asian countries.Table 9.6 Statistics on WTO disputes by parties (until December 31, 2003)
Number of cases  Number of cases 




Hong Kong, China 1 1
Indonesia 4 2 6
Japan 13 11 24
Korea 12 10 22
Malaysia 1 1 2
The Philippines 4 4 8
Singapore 1 1
Thailand 1 10 11
Total 35 42 79
Notable others
Argentina 15 9 24
Australia 9 7 16
Brazil 12 22 34
Canada 12 24 36
European Communities 59 63 122
India 15 15 29
Mexico 10 13 23
United States 81 76 157
Total by all members 305 333a 638
Source: See Leitner and Lester (2004, 171–72, note 31).
aThe discrepancy between the numbers is due to the fact that, in some cases, there are multiple
complainants against one respondent.
Fig. 9.1 Yearly trend of WTO dispute cases (until December 31, 2003)for complaints by the East Asian countries, except for by Thailand,




As a complainant, the primary disputing party for Japan has been the
United States. Up to date, seven out of ten complaints are against the
United States. In terms of subject matters, trade remedy measures, partic-
ularly antidumping measures by the United States, were the major issue to
be disputed. One interesting observation is that Japan’s challenges were
mostly accompanied by the EC. Six out of eight cases reaching the panel
procedure were complained jointly with the EC. Even the US—Sunset Re-
view case (DS244) may be viewed as joint eﬀorts with the EC following the
US—German Steel CVD case (DS213). These joint complaints were not
just against the United States but also Canada and Indonesia.
It is also noted that the automotive industry in Japan has actively uti-
lized the WTO dispute settlement system to address WTO-inconsistent
trade barriers in foreign markets. In that regard, it is noteworthy that three
complaints against Brazil, Indonesia, and Canada are all concerned with
measures related to the automobile industry. Considering the fact that the
very ﬁrst WTO complaint by Japan against the United States also dealt
with the automobile industry, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism ap-
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29. As of December 31, 2003, the EC was challenged by the East Asian countries in six
cases, among which four cases were brought by Thailand.
Fig. 9.2 WTO dispute cases for East Asian countries (until December 31, 2003)pears to play a crucial role for rectifying unfair competitive conditions re-
garding Japanese automotive industries. (See table 9.7.)
The very ﬁrst complaint by Japan to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB), US—Imposition of Import Duties on Automobiles from Japan under
Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade Act of 1974 (DS6), indeed provided the
Japanese government with profound conﬁdence in the new system. Right
after the WTO began its work in 1995, the United States threatened the
unilateral retaliation on Japanese automobiles under Section 301.30 In-
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Table 9.7 WTO disputes involving Japan
As complainant
United States—Imposition of Import Duties on Automobiles  DS6 Mutually resolved
from Japan under Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade Act of 
1974
Brazil—Certain Automotive Investment Measures DS51 In consultation
Indonesia—Certain Aﬀecting the Automobile Industry DS55 P/AB report
Indonesia—Certain Automotive Industry Measures DS64 P/AB report
United States—Measure Aﬀecting Government Procurement DS95 Inactive
Canada—Certain Measures Aﬀecting the Automotive Industry DS139 P/AB report
United States—Antidumping Act of 1916 DS162 P/AB report
United States—Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled  DS184 P/AB report
Steel Products from Japan
United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Oﬀset Act  DS217 P/AB report
of 2000
United States—Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on  DS244 P/AB report
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan
United States—Deﬁnitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of  DS249 P/AB report
Certain Steel Products
As respondent
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages DS8/EC, P/AB  report
DS10/Canada, 
DS11/US
Japan—Measures Aﬀecting the Equipment of  DS15/EC Inactive
Telecommunications Equipment
Japan—Measures Concerning the Protection of Sound  DS28/US,  Mutually resolved
Recordings DS42/EC
Japan—Measures Aﬀecting Consumer Photographic Film  DS44/US P/AB report
and Paper
Japan—Measure Aﬀecting Distribution Services DS45/US In consultation
Japan—Measures Aﬀecting Imports of Pork DS66/EC In consultation
Japan—Procurement of a Navigation Satellite DS73/EC Mutually resolved
Japan—Measures Aﬀecting Agricultural Products DS76/US P/AB report
Japan—Tariﬀ Quotas and Subsidies Aﬀecting Leather DS147/EC In consultation
Japan—Measures Aﬀecting the Importation of Apples DS245/US P/AB report
Notes: “P/AB Report” means panel and Appellate Body reports were issued. “In AB” means the case is
currently in the Appellate Body proceeding. Cases in italics indicate that panel reports were issued.
30. The legal justiﬁcation of this Section 301 measure was, in fact, controversial. See Jack-
son, “US Threat to New World Trade Order,” Financial Times (May 23, 1995, 17).stead of undertaking “negotiations” as previously done, the Japanese gov-
ernment resorted to the WTO dispute settlement system by challenging the
Section 301 measures.31The United States ﬁnally withdrew the Section 301
threat, and both parties notiﬁed the settlement of the dispute to the WTO
on July 19, 1995 (Bhala 1998, 1066–68). The outcome of this case forcefully
illustrated the eﬀectiveness and usefulness of the WTO dispute settlement
system as opposed to unilateralism.
Japan as Respondent
As a respondent, Japan has been challenged mostly by the EC and the
United States. It is noted that whereas Japan has been challenged most by
the EC, it has not raised so far any consultation request against the EC.
Unlike other WTO members, especially the United States and the EC that
have frequently utilized trade remedy measures to protect domestic indus-
tries, Japan rarely relied on those measures to constrain importation. Ac-
cordingly, Japan has never been challenged concerning application of trade
remedy measures, which is, in fact, the most frequently disputed issue un-
der the WTO dispute settlement system. Instead, the challenged area for
Japan encompassed a range of issues from domestic tax system to distri-
bution services and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures for agri-
cultural products.
Interestingly, complaints against Japan were concentrated during the
early WTO years, particularly 1995–1997. The last consultation request
against Japan was submitted to the WTO on October 8, 1998 by the EC
concerning the management of the tariﬀ quotas for leather and the subsi-
dies allegedly beneﬁting the leather industry and “Dowa” regions. The
consultation for this case is technically pending yet. Since then, Japan has
not been challenged by other WTO members. This may be explained by the
fact that complaints against Japan under the WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem have been concerning more systemic issues rather than case-speciﬁc
actions, such as trade remedy measures, that are hardly used by the Japa-
nese government. In other words, after somewhat intensive probing byother
WTO members in the early WTO years, systemic or legal inconsistency of
domestic policy measures or legal systems were mostly addressed and modi-
ﬁed to comply with the WTO disciplines. There remain, therefore, few
systemic problems to be addressed, at least in terms of the current WTO
disciplines.
Among ten challenged cases, Japan—Measures Aﬀecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper (DS44, Japan—Film) deserves more expla-
nation. This case is so far the only case in which the primary complaint is
based on nonviolation claims (Durling and Lester 1999). Despite strenu-
ous eﬀorts by the United States to vindicate its claims, the panel ruled
that the United States failed to demonstrate that, under GATT Article
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31. See WTO, WT/DS6/1.XXIII:1(b), the distribution measures nullify or impair beneﬁts accruing
to the United States.32This ultimate legal victory for Japan under the WTO
dispute settlement system, after initiated by positive determination under
the Section 301 proceeding, substantially strengthened the Japanese gov-
ernment’s position concerning its domestic trade policies.33 Typically,
Japan has been vulnerable to blame for its convoluted nontariﬀ barriers.
But after this case, the Japanese government has become much more re-
luctant to accept its trading partners’ loose allegations concerning unjus-
tiﬁed or unreasonable nontariﬀ barriers, at least those administered by the
government.
Under the WTO system, Japan’s dispute settlement has predominantly
dealt with the United States. In terms of subject matters, antidumping
measures, particularly by the United States, have been a major area for dis-
pute settlement. On the other hand, the EC brought the most complaints
regarding trade barriers in Japan. It is noted that Japan has not raised any
complaints against the EC under the WTO system, although the EC was
the most frequent target of Japan’s complaints under the GATT system. It
is also noteworthy that Japan is now one of the most active third parties for
the WTO dispute settlement. As a third party, Japan has showed a strong
interest in disputes concerning measures by the U.S. government.
9.3.3 Korea
Under the WTO system, the Korean government changed a dispute aver-
sion attitude and has become considerably more active in asserting its rights
through the dispute settlement mechanism.34 Incidentally, since the middle
1990s, the trade balances with those major trading partners have been re-
versed and showed substantial deﬁcits. For example, the trade deﬁcit of
Korea with respect to the United States began to occur from 1994 and
remained throughout 1997, reaching $8.5 billion in 1997. This trend was
again reversed in 1998 primarily due to the ﬁnancial crisis that caused im-
ports to plummet. Although there were some diﬀerences in the magnitude
of the trade imbalances, the overall trends of trade balance were very much
the same with respect to other major trading partners. The changes in such
underlying economic circumstances would partly explain the more aggres-
sive attitude of the Korean government toward formal dispute resolution.
Korea as Respondent
As of December 31, 2003, Korea was challenged by twelve complaints
on nine distinct matters, as summarized in table 9.8. It is noted that com-
plainants against Korea have so far been raised mostly by the United States
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32. WTO, WT/DS44/R (adopted on April 22, 1998).
33. For comprehensive coverage of the relevant legal proceedings and documents concern-
ing the Japan—Film case, see Durling (2001).
34. This part is substantially drawn from Ahn (2003).and the EC. The only two other complaints were ﬁled by Australia and
Canada. Since the Korean government commenced the litigation of WTO
cases in Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, it seems predetermined to
exhaust the full procedure of the dispute settlement system, at least if con-
tested by other members.
Settlement by Consultation: Not Yet Ready to Litigate. Korea was a re-
spondent in some of the very early cases in the WTO dispute settlement,
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Table 9.8 WTO disputes involving Korea
As complainant
United States—Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Imports  DS89 In consultation
of Color Television Receivers from Korea
United States—Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access  DS99 Mutually resolved
Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or above 
from Korea
United States—Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate  DS179 P/AB report
in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea
United States—Deﬁnitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of  DS202 P/AB report
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea
Philippines—Antidumping Measures regarding Polypropylene  DS215 In consultation
Resins from Korea
United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Oﬀset Act  DS217 P/AB report
of 2000
United States—Deﬁnitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of  DS251 P/AB report
Certain Steel Products
United States—Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic  DS296 In panel
Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from 
Korea
EC—Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access  DS299 In panel
Memory Chips from Korea
EC—Measures Aﬀecting Commercial Vessels DS301 In panel
As respondent
Korea—Measures Concerning the Testing and Inspection of  DS3, DS41/US In consultation
Agricultural Products
Korea—Measures Concerning the Shelf Life of Products DS5/US Mutually resolved
Korea—Measures Concerning Bottled Water DS20/Canada Mutually resolved
Korea—Laws, Regulations, and Practices in the  DS40/EC Mutually resolved
Telecommunications Procurement Sector
Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages DS75/EC, P/AB  report
DS84/US
Korea—Deﬁnitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain  DS98/EC P/AB report
Dairy Products
Korea—Measures Aﬀecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen  DS161/US, P/AB  report
Beef DS169/Australia
Korea—Measures Aﬀecting Government Procurement DS163/US P/AB report
Korea—Measures Aﬀecting Trade in Commercial Vessels DS273/EC In panel
Note: Cases in italics indicate that panel reports were issued.which concerned somewhat unfamiliar obligations under the SPS and
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements. The United States made a
consultation request against Korea on April 6, 1995 (DS3) and basically on
the same matter again on May 24, 1996 (DS41).35 Both cases were sus-
pended because the United States did not take additional steps. On May 5,
1995, the United States made a consultation request regarding the regu-
lation on the shelf life of products (DS5). This case was settled with a mu-
tually acceptable solution.36 The Canadian request for consultation re-
garding the Korean regulation on the shelf life and disinfection treatment
of bottled water was also settled with a mutually satisfactory solution
(DS20).37 These four complaints were based on the SPS and TBT agree-
ments in addition to the GATT and could be settled promptly.
On May 9, 1996, the EC requested consultations, alleging that the pro-
curement practices for the Korean telecommunications sector were dis-
criminatory against foreign suppliers and that the bilateral agreement with
the United States was preferential (DS40). The parties also agreed on a mu-
tually satisfactory solution during the consultation.38
The Korean government basically tried to settle the ﬁrst ﬁve complaints,
rather than actually litigate the cases. This is partly because the merits of
the cases were relatively clear and partly because the economic stakes at is-
sue were not substantial. In addition, the Korean government was not
suﬃciently prepared to handle the newly instituted WTO dispute settle-
ment system in the procedural aspect and unfamiliar legal issues concern-
ing the SPS and TBT agreements in the substantive aspect.
Full Litigation: Fight to the End. The very ﬁrst case in which Korea experi-
enced the whole WTO dispute settlement procedure was the Korea—Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea—Soju) case (DS75 and DS84). The EC and
the United States contended that the Korean liquor taxes of 100 percent on
whiskey and 35 percent on diluted soju were not consistent with the na-
tional treatment obligation under Article III of the GATT. Basically, this
case was considered as a “revisited” Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
(Japan—Shochu) case (DS8, DS10, and DS11), in which the Japanese tax
system to discriminate imported alcoholic beverages over shochu was
found to be in violation of Article III of the GATT. As a legal strategy to
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35. The second consultation request by the United States encompassed all amendments, re-
visions, and new measures adopted by the Korean government after the ﬁrst consultation re-
quest. See WTO, WT/DS41/1, dated May 31, 1996.
36. See WTO, WT/DS5/5, dated July 31, 1995.
37. See WTO, WT/DS20/6, dated May 6, 1996.
38. See WTO, WT/DS40/2, dated October 29, 1997. Korea and the EC signed the Agree-
ment on Telecommunications Procurement between the Republic of Korea and the European
Community on October 29, 1997, and the agreement entered into force on November 1, 1997.
Subsequently, Korea entered into a similar bilateral agreement for telecommunications
equipment procurement with Canada. See Lie and Ahn (2003).distinguish this case from the Japan—Shochu case, the Korean govern-
ment tried to inject more antitrust law principles and experts in the panel
proceeding because a large price gap between soju and whiskey might be
deemed to represent a noncompetitive relationship of pertinent products
in the antitrust law context.39
The panel and the appellate body held that the Korean taxes on sojuand
whiskey were discriminatory and the DSB adopted this ruling on February
17, 1999. The reasonable period for implementation was determined to be
eleven months and two weeks, that is, from February 17, 1999 to January
31, 2000.40 Subsequently, Korea amended the Liquor Tax Law and the Ed-
ucation Tax Law to impose ﬂat rates of 72 percent in liquor tax and 30 per-
cent in education tax that entered into force on January 1, 2000.41The DSB
recommendation was successfully implemented a month earlier than the
due date.
This case awakened the Korean public about the role and inﬂuence of the
WTO dispute settlement system. The media and newspapers closely cov-
ered every step pertaining to this case, from the consultation request to the
panel proceeding and the Appellate Body ruling. It was not just because
this case was the ﬁrst WTO dispute settlement proceeding for Korea but
also because the popularity of the product concerned, soju, was probably
incomparable to any other product in Korea. Despite objections by the
general public as well as by soju manufacturers, the Korean government
amended the tax laws to substantially increase liquor taxes on soju,instead
of reducing the liquor tax on whiskey to the original level on soju, in order
to eliminate the WTO-illegal tax gap while minimizing the potential ad-
verse impact on public health and consequent social costs.42 By experienc-
ing the impact of the WTO dispute settlement decision, probably at the
deepest and widest level of daily life, this case has played a crucial role in
enhancing WTO awareness in Korea.
The ﬁrst dispute settlement case under the Agreement on Safeguards
also involved the Korean safeguard measure concerning dairy products
(DS98).43 On August 12, 1997, the EC requested consultations with Korea
regarding the safeguard quotas that went into eﬀect on March 7, 1997 and
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39. For example, the Korean government tried to include antitrust law experts regardless
of their nationality as panelists, but failed due to the objection by the complainants. See Kim
(1999, 465–66). Except for this case, the Korean government as a respondent did not resort
to the director general for the panel selection.
40. WTO, WT/DS75/16, WT/DS84/14, dated June 4, 1999.
41. WTO, WT/DS75/18, WT/DS84/16, dated January 17, 2000.
42. See, generally, Korea Institute of Public Finance (September 1999, 82–102). Monthly
Public Finance Forum (in Korean).
43. The ﬁrst complaint brought under the Agreement on Safeguards was US—Safeguard
Measure against Imports of Broom Corn Brooms. See WTO, WT/DS78/1, dated May 1, 1997.
This case was resolved without litigation although it remained technically pending. The ac-
tual panel decision concerning safeguard measures in the WTO system was issued for the ﬁrst
time in Korea—Dairy Safeguards. See WTO, WT/DS98/R, adopted January 12, 2000.were to remain in force until February 28, 2001.44The panel and the Appel-
late Body held that the Korean safeguard measures were inconsistent with
the obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards. The DSB adopted
those rulings on January 12, 2000, and the reasonable implementation pe-
riod was agreed to expire on May 20, 2000. Korea, through its administra-
tive procedures, eﬀectively lifted the safeguard measure on imports of
the dairy products as of May 20, 2000.
Since its inception in 1987 to 1994, the Korea Trade Commission (KTC)
had relied more on safeguard measures than on antidumping measures to
address injury to domestic industries incurred by importation.45 During
1987 to 1994, the KTC engaged in twenty-ﬁve safeguard and twelve an-
tidumping investigations that resulted in sixteen safeguard and eight an-
tidumping measures.46 After this case, however, the KTC markedly ab-
stained from using a safeguard measure whereas it substantially increased
antidumping actions. For example, from 1997 to 2002, there were only four
safeguard investigations but forty-six antidumping cases.47 Accordingly,
subsequent safeguard actions by the KTC appeared seriously disciplined
by the WTO dispute settlement system. The safeguard mechanism in Ko-
rea was further elaborated with new laws and regulations on trade remedy
actions.48
On the other hand, it was reported that the importation of dairy prod-
ucts at issue was reduced by about $70 million during the period in which
the safeguard measure remained in force. This result, along with the out-
come from Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Ar-
gentina—Footwear)49 case whose proceedings were conducted almost con-
comitantly, raised an important systemic issue for the WTO safeguard
system. In the Korea—Deﬁnitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain
Dairy Products case, the termination of illegal safeguard measures pur-
suant to the DSB recommendation was undertaken only nine months prior
to the original due date of the measures. In the Argentina—Footwear case,
the implementation of the DSB recommendation by repealing the safe-
guard measure coincided with the original due date of the measure. Thus,
the experience from these early safeguard cases raised imminent need for
considering expeditious or accelerated dispute settlement procedures.
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44. See WTO, G/SG/N/10/KOR/1, dated January 27, 1997 and G/SG/N/10/KOR/1/Supp.1,
dated April 1, 1997.
45. On the other hand, the KTC has never even initiated a countervailing investigation to
date. See Korea Trade Commission, A History of 10 Years for the KTC,in Korean (1997, 280–
299).
46. Ibid.
47. See Korea Trade Commission, Summary Report of Trade Remedy Action (in Korean;
February 2003, 1).
48. These are the Act on Investigation of Unfair Trade Practice and Trade Remedy Mea-
sures, Law 6417; and Implementing Regulation, Presidential Order no. 17222.
49. See WTO, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted January 12, 2000. See also WTO, WT/DSB/M/
75, dated March 7, 2000, at 2.On February 1, 1999, the United States requested consultations with
Korea in respect to a dual retail system for beef (Korea–Beef II; DS161).
On April 13, 1999, Australia also requested consultations on the same ba-
sis (DS169). On January 10, 2001, the DSB adopted the panel and the Ap-
pellate Body reports that held that the Korean measures to be inconsistent
with the WTO obligation. The parties to the dispute agreed that a reason-
able implementation period would be eight months and thus expire on Sep-
tember 10, 2001.50The Korean government subsequently revised the ‘Man-
agement Guideline for Imported Beef’ to abolish the beef import system
operated by the Livestock Products Marketing Organization.51 In addi-
tion, on September 10, 2001, the Korean government eliminated the dual
retail system for beef by entirely abolishing the Management Guideline for
Imported Beef.52Thus, Korea considered that it had fully implemented the
DSB’s recommendation in this case.53
The only dispute settlement case concerning the Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement (GPA) to date is Korea—Measures Aﬀecting Govern-
ment Procurement (DS163).54 On February 16, 1999, the United States re-
quested consultations regarding certain procurement practices of the
Korean Airport Construction Authority (KOACA). The panel ultimately
ruled that the KOACA was not a covered entity under Korea’s Appendix I
of the GPA, even if the panel noted that the conduct of the Korean gov-
ernment with respect to the U.S. inquiries in the course of pertinent nego-
tiation “[could], at best, be described as inadequate.”55 The United States
did not make an appeal, and the panel report was adopted on June 19,
2000.56 One of the important lessons from this case for the Korean govern-
ment was about the discrepancy between its organizational mechanism for
governmental oﬃces that is based on decision-making structures and the
WTO concession practice that is based on the institutional “entities” in the
context of the GPA. The Government Organization Act of the Republic of
Korea prescribes various government entities that actually constitute mere
positions of certain level. Moreover, the Korean government has often es-
tablished a special task force, group, or committee with speciﬁc mandates,
whose legal foundations are obscure (Cho 2000, 152). This issue of how to
determine the scope of covered entities in relation to a newly established
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50. See WTO, WT/DS161, DS169/12, dated April 24, 2001.
51. See Ministry of Agriculture Notiﬁcation 2000-82.
52. See Ministry of Agriculture Notiﬁcation 2001-54.
53. See WTO, WT/DSB/M/110, dated October 22, 2001.
54. This case is the fourth complaint concerning government procurement. The ﬁrst com-
plaint, Japan—Procurement of a Navigation Satellite(DS73), was settled with a mutually sat-
isfactory solution. The second and third complaints, US—Measure Aﬀecting Government
Procurement (DS88, DS95), were in respect to the same issue. The panel’s authority lapsed as
of February 11, 2000, when it was not requested to resume the proceeding after suspension of
the works. See WTO, WT/DS88, DS95/6, dated February 14, 2000.
55. See WTO, WT/DS163/R, adopted on June 19, 2000, paragraph 7.80.
56. See WTO, WT/DS163/7, dated November 6, 2000.governmental organ may require a more elaborate approach in the context
of the GPA.
On October 24, 2000, the Committee of European Union Shipbuilders
Associations ﬁled a complaint under the trade barriers regulation (TBR)
procedure concerning divergent ﬁnancial arrangements for Korean ship-
building industries. Although the commission was mindful of the extraor-
dinary situation in Korea that was caused by the ﬁnancial crisis in 1997, it
found that parts of corporate restructuring programs and assistance
through taxation for shipbuilding companies constituted prohibited subsi-
dies within the meaning of the SCM.57 On October 21, 2002, the EC made
a formal request for a consultation with Korea under the WTO dispute
settlement system on various corporate restructuring measures for the
shipbuilding industry, alleging that they constituted prohibited subsidies
under the SCM.58
This case was merely the beginning of much more controversial trade
conﬂicts as regards corporate restructuring programs undertaken by the
Korean government as parts of the IMF program to overcome the ﬁnan-
cial crisis. On July 25, 2002, the European Commission initiated a coun-
tervailing investigation on the Korean semiconductor producers, alleging
that the governmental intervention in terms of debt-for-equity swaps and
debt forgiveness for pertinent companies established illegal subsidies.59
They concluded the countervailing proceeding with 35 percent of ﬁnal du-
ties. Apart from the EC’s action against the Korean government, the U.S.
authorities also initiated a countervailing investigation in November 2002
that ended up with a ﬁnal determination for countervailing duties up to
57.73 percent.60 The ﬁnal duty was slightly reduced to 44.29 percent when
the U.S. authorities corrected calculation mistakes.61 These concomitant
actions in the two major markets, if sustained in the ﬁnal determinations,
would risk the whole fate of the third largest semiconductor producer in
the world. Furthermore, the legal validity of those actions would have sig-
niﬁcant implications for many other Korean industries that experienced
similar restructuring programs in the course of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) program during the past few years. The Korean government
brought complaints against both actions to the WTO DSB to vindicate the
legitimacy of its systemic and structural measures adopted during the IMF
program. The outcome of the WTO dispute settlement related to this dis-
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57. See Commission Decision 2002/818/EC, OJ 2002 L 281/15.
58. See WTO, WT/DS273/1, dated October 24, 2002.
59. See WTO, G/SCM/N/93/EEC, dated March 12, 2003.
60. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Preliminary Aﬃrmative Countervailing Duty De-
termination: Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors from the Republic of Korea,
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/drams-korea-draft-prelim-fr-notice.pdf.
61. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Notice of Amended Final Aﬃrmative Countervail-
ing Duty Determination: Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors from the Republic
of Korea (C-580-851).pute would certainly be an interesting and important addition to the WTO
jurisprudence.
Overall Comments.Considering the experience so far as a respondent in the
WTO dispute settlement, the reaction by the Korean government appears
to show a typical pattern of an average WTO member. For half of the com-
plaints, Korea tried to settle the trade disputes without resorting to legal
procedures. But, as it obtained more experience and the WTO jurispru-
dence became more sophisticated, Korea has become determined to take a
more legalistic approach in dealing with complaints by other members.
When engaged in a WTO legal proceeding, Korea has been in full com-
pliance with DSB recommendations. For all three cases in which Korea
was found to be inconsistent with the WTO agreements, Korea fully im-
plemented the DSB recommendations within the determined or agreed
reasonable periods of time, even in politically loaded areas such as taxes
and agriculture. It is also noted that Korea made appeals for all three cases
in which the panels found some violations for its own measures. Last, it
should also be noted that the areas challenged by other member countries
are fairly diverse, ranging from SPS and TBT measures to government pro-
curement, safeguard, domestic taxes, and retailing distribution systems.
This is starkly contrasted with the cases in which Korea brought com-
plaints, which concentrated mainly on antidumping measures. Overall, the
dispute settlement experience of Korea as a respondent in such divergent
areas under the auspice of the WTO has played a signiﬁcant role in en-
hancing the public recognition of the importance of the multilateral trade
norms in all aspects of economic activities and policy making.
Korea as Complainant
So far, the Korean complaints in the WTO dispute settlement system
have focused primarily on the U.S. trade remedy measures, especially anti-
dumping measures. Five out of the total nine complaints concerned anti-
dumping matters, and seven complaints were against the United States.
Only one case was against the Philippines, and the other was against the
EC. Two cases concerned safeguard measures, and the other two con-
cerned countervailing duties. In other words, the Korean complaints to the
WTO dispute settlement system up to date can be simply summarized as
exclusive concentration on trade remedy issues, predominantly caused by
U.S. antidumping measures.
While Korea had been challenged in the WTO dispute settlement system
from a very early period,62 Korea appeared quite hesitant to bring com-
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62. In 1995, three consultation requests were brought against Korea. The ﬁrst two requests,
Korea—Measures Concerning the Testing and Inspection of Agricultural Products (DS3) and
Korea—Measures Concerning the Shelf-Life of Products (DS5), were made on April 6 and
May 5, 1995.plaints against other WTO member countries. It was not until July 1997
that Korea began to use the WTO dispute settlement system as a com-
plainant. The ﬁrst WTO case Korea brought to the DSB was in respect to
the U.S. antidumping duties on Samsung color television receivers. On July
10, 1997, Korea requested a consultation, alleging that the United States
had maintained an antidumping duty order for the past twelve years de-
spite the cessation of exports as well as the absence of dumping. Subse-
quently, in response to the U.S. preliminary determination of December
19, 1997 to revoke the antidumping duty order, Korea withdrew its request
for a panel. On August 27, 1998, the United States made a ﬁnal determi-
nation to revoke the antidumping duty order that had been imposed on
Samsung color television receivers since 1984. At the DSB meeting on Sep-
tember 22, 1998, Korea announced that it deﬁnitively withdrew the request
for a panel because the imposition of antidumping duties had been re-
voked.63
For a similar case regarding antidumping duty orders on dynamic ran-
dom access memory semiconductors (DRAMS), however,  the United
States did not readily revoke the orders and, on November 6, 1997, Korea
requested the establishment of a panel. The DSB established a panel at its
meeting on January 16, 1998. On March 19, 1998, the director general
completed the panel composition, and Korea began its ﬁrst panel pro-
ceeding as a complainant. The panel found the measures at issue to be in
violation of Article 11.2 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.64 The
United States did not make an appeal, and the DSB adopted the panel re-
port on March 19, 1999.
Incidentally, this ﬁrst win as a complainant in US—DRAMS came just
eleven days after Korea lost its ﬁrst WTO litigation as a respondent in Ko-
rea—Soju.65 This somewhat fortunate timing of winning a WTO case con-
tributed to alleviating the general concern and skepticism of the Korean
public about the fairness and objectivity of the WTO dispute settlement
system.
The two parties agreed on an implementation period of eight months,
expiring on November 19, 1999. At the DSB meeting on January 27, 2000,
the United States stated that it had implemented the DSB recommenda-
tions by amending the pertinent Department of Commerce (DOC) regula-
tion, more speciﬁcally, by deleting the “not likely” standard and incorpo-
rating the “necessary” standard of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.
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63. See WTO, WT/DS89/9, dated September 18, 1998.
64. See WTO panel report, United States—Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Ac-
cess Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US—
DRAMS), WT/DS99/R, adopted March 19, 1999.
65. The Appellate Body report for the Korea—Soju case was circulated on January 18,
1999, while the panel report for the US—DRAMS case was circulated on January 29, 1999.
See WTO, Korea—Soju, WT/DS75, DS84/AB/R, adopted February 17, 1999.The DOC, however, issued a revised Final Results of Redetermination in
the third administrative review on November 4, 1999, concluding that, be-
cause a resumption of dumping was likely, it was necessary to leave the an-
tidumping order in place. On April 6, 2000, Korea requested the referral of
this matter to the original panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU and
the EC reserved its third-party right. On September 19, 2000, Korea re-
quested the panel to suspend its work and, on October 20, 2000, the par-
ties notiﬁed the DSB of a mutually satisfactory solution to the matter, in-
volving the revocation of the antidumping order at issue as the result of a
ﬁve-year “sunset” review by the DOC.66
This case was the ﬁrst case ever in which Korea won a favorable panel de-
cision throughout the GATT/WTO system. Although it took one and a half
more years for the United States to satisfactorily comply with the DSB rec-
ommendation after the adoption of the panel report, the sheer fact of win-
ning a WTO dispute concerning chronic trade barriers of the major trading
partners furnished the Korean government with conﬁdence in the new
WTO dispute settlement system. Unfortunately, however, the dismal imple-
mentation by the United States after the panel proceeding compromised
conﬁdence of a relatively new user concerning the eﬀectiveness and fairness
of the WTO dispute settlement system.67In any case, US—DRAMSclearly
led the Korean government to adopt a more legal approach by utilizing the
WTO dispute settlement system to address foreign trade barriers in subse-
quent cases. In other words, the experience and conﬁdence gained from this
case clearly led the Korean government to move to the direction of “ag-
gressive legalism” in handling subsequent trade disputes.68
The United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in
Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea (Korea—Stainless
Steel) case dealt with two separate antidumping actions by the U.S. au-
thorities concerning stainless steel plate in coils (plate) and stainless steel
sheet and strip in coils (sheet). For the antidumping case on plate, the DOC
selected January 1 to December 31, 1997 as the period of investigation and
issued the ﬁnal dumping margin of 16.26 percent. The antidumping case
for sheet covered April 1, 1997 through March 31, 1998 as the period of in-
vestigation and issued the ﬁnal dumping margin of 58.79 percent for Tai-
wan and 12.12 percent for other Korean exporters, including POSCO. In
this case, the panel was established on November 19, 1999 but actually
composed on March 24, 2000.69
WTO Dispute Settlements in East Asia 309
66. See WTO, WT/DS99/12, dated October 25, 2000.
67. For more positive assessment for Article 21.5 proceedings, see, generally, Kearns and
Charnovitz (2002).
68. For the discussion of “aggressive legalism” by the Japanese government to deal with
trade disputes, see Pekkanen (2001, 707–37).
69. It took 126 days to compose the panel, which is so far the longest period of time required
for the panel appointment in cases involving Korea.The underlying economic situation for this case is remarkably aberra-
tional (Lane et al. 1999). The pertinent investigation periods included un-
precedented ﬂuctuation of exchange rates caused by the ﬁnancial crisis.
As illustrated in ﬁgure 9.3, the value of the Korean currency, won, precip-
itated to a half in a time span of just three months. The WTO panel found
that the methodology adopted by the DOC to deal with such abnormity,
including double currency conversion and the use of multiple averaging
periods, were not consistent with the WTO obligations. Without the
United States’s appeal, the DSB adopted the panel report on February 1,
2001.
This case showed how vulnerable exporters might be in terms of an-
tidumping actions as the exchange rates became abnormally ﬂuctuating.
Because dumping margin calculation permits various price adjustment to
ﬁnd ex-factory prices but no modiﬁcation for volatile exchange rates except
for averaging, unstable exchange rates can cause serious distortion in cal-
culating dumping margins. This systemic problem may expose more ex-
porters in developing countries that suﬀer from vacillating exchange rates
to additional risks of being targeted by antidumping actions. Based on the
Korean experience during the ﬁnancial crisis, in which foreign exchange
rates ﬂuctuated at more than a normal or reasonable level, members may
consider suspension of antidumping actions at least for a certain range of
dumping margins that should reﬂect potential methodological errors. In
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Fig. 9.3 Won/Dollar exchange rate trends
Sources: Bank of Korea, Principal Economic Indicators (March 2003). See also http://www
.bok.or.kr.other words, members may consider an increase of the current de minimis
level for a period with exchange rate aberration.
On June 13, 2000, Korea made its fourth consultation request, again
with the United States, in respect to the deﬁnitive safeguard measure im-
posed on imports of circular welded carbon quality line pipe. The deﬁni-
tive safeguard measure actually imposed by the president on February 11,
2000 was much more restrictive than that recommended by the Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC), disproportionately injuring the largest
suppliers, that is, Korean exporters.70 The exemption of Mexican and
Canadian suppliers from the safeguard measure led them to become the
largest and third-largest suppliers.
Korea considered that the U.S. procedures and determinations to im-
pose the safeguard measure, as well as the measure itself, contravened var-
ious obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards and the GATT 1994.
The panel concluded that the U.S. measure was imposed in a manner in-
consistent with the WTO obligations. In the Appellate Body proceeding,71
Korea’s argument on the permissible extent of a safeguard measure was
accepted, which seems one of the key ﬁndings for the WTO jurisprudence
on safeguard.72
It is noted that this appellate proceeding was the ﬁrst WTO dispute
settlement litigation handled entirely by Korean government oﬃcials. It
was a substantial development for Korea in terms of capacity building for
utilizing the WTO dispute settlement system, particularly considering the
previous cases in which foreign legal counsels played primary roles in WTO
litigations. Moreover, when considering the fact that Korea is one of the
WTO Members that did contribute to set the procedural practices to per-
mit private counsel in a dispute settlement proceeding, the outcome of
the US—Line Pipe appellate proceeding substantially enhanced self-
conﬁdence and capacity in terms of much needed legal expertise.
When both parties agreed on the reasonable period of time for imple-
mentation, with expiration on September 1, 2002, the arbitration under
DSU Article 21.3 was suspended.73 The U.S. government agreed to in-
crease the in-quota volume of imports to 17,500 tons and lower the safe-
guard tariﬀ to 11 percent, with the termination due of March 1, 2003.74
WTO Dispute Settlements in East Asia 311
70. The imports above the ﬁrst 9,000 short tons from each country would be subject to a 19
percent, 15 percent, and 11 percent duty for the ﬁrst, second, and third year. See WTO panel
report, United States—Deﬁnitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon
Quality Line Pipe from Korea(US—Line Pipe), WT/DS202/R, adopted March 8, 2002, para-
graph 2.5.
71. See WTO Appellate Body report, US—Line Pipe, WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted March
8, 2002. The United States initially ﬁled an appeal on November 6, 2001 (WT/DS202/7) but
withdrew it for scheduling reasons on November 13 (WT/DS202/8). The appeal was reﬁled
on November 19, 2001 (WT/DS202/9).
72. See, generally, Ahn (2001).
73. See WTO, WT/DS202/17, dated July 26, 2002.
74. See WTO, WT/DS202/18, dated July 31, 2002.But, considering that the original due date of the safeguard measure that
was set at February 24, 2003, the practical impact of the WTO dispute
settlement system was to increase the in-quota volume from 9,000 to
17,500 tons only for the period of September 1, 2002 to February 24, 2003,
while the latter measure remained until the end of February 2003. Thus,
this case again illustrated the systemic problem in implementation of a
safeguard dispute.
On December 15, 2000, Korea requested consultations with the Philip-
pines concerning the dumping decision of the Tariﬀ Commission of the
Philippines on polypropylene resins. This antidumping order was actually
the ﬁrst antidumping measure by the Philippines against Korean ex-
porters, as the ﬁrst antidumping investigation against Korean electrolytic
tinplates was dismissed for lack of merit.75 The Tariﬀ Commission of the
Philippines imposed the provisional antidumping duties on polypropylene
resins ranging from 4.20 percent to 40.53 percent and subsequently the ﬁ-
nal duties at slightly lowered levels.76 Following the consultation on Jan-
uary 19, 2001 under the purview of the WTO dispute settlement system,
the Philippines withdrew the antidumping order on November 8, 2001,
and Korea did not pursue further action in the DSB.77 This case is so far
the only trade dispute for Korea elevated to the formal dispute settlement
procedure as opposed to a developing country.
The ﬁfth WTO complaint by Korea against the United States was also
related to antidumping matters. On December 21, 2000, Korea, along with
Australia, Brazil, Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand, re-
quested consultations with the United States concerning the amendment
to the Tariﬀ Act of 1930, titled Continued Dumping and Subsidy Oﬀset
Act of 2000 that is usually referred to as the Byrd Amendment. By distrib-
uting the antidumping and countervailing duties to domestic petitioners,
the Byrd Amendment aimed to create more incentives to bring trade rem-
edy actions. As the third-frequent target for antidumping and countervail-
ing measures in the U.S. market, Korean exporters were very keen on the
outcome of this case.78
The panel established by the requests from nine members was later
merged with the panel requested by Canada and Mexico. The panel and the
Appellate Body found that the Byrd Amendment was inconsistent with the
Antidumping and SCM. Furthermore, the panel suggested that the United
States bring the Byrd Amendment into conformity by repealing it. On
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75. See WTO, G/ADP/N/65/PHL, dated September 21, 2000.
76. See WTO, G/ADP/N/72/PHL, dated March 6, 2001.
77. See WTO, G/ADP/N/85/PHL, dated February 22, 2002.
78. For antidumping measures, exporters from China and Japan are more frequent targets
than those from Korea in the U.S. market. U.S. countervailing measures have targeted Italy,
India, Korea, and France. See WTO, Statistics on Anti-dumping, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/adp_e.htm and Statistics on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_stattab8_e.htm.April 2, 2003, the arbitrator was appointed to determine a reasonable pe-
riod of implementation under DSU Article 21.3.
Ironically, a subsidiary company of a Korean manufacturer received a
substantial “oﬀset” disbursement under the Byrd Amendment. Zenith
Electronics, owned by LG Electronics, received the disbursement of $24.3
million in 2001 and $9 million in 2002 from antidumping duties collected
on Japanese television imports. The oﬀset payment for Zenith Electronics
in 2001 was indeed more than 10 percent of the total disbursement of
$231.2 million in 2001.79 In 2002, the total disbursement under the Byrd
Amendment was increased to $329.8 million.80
On March 20, 2002, Korea requested consultation with the United States
regarding the deﬁnitive safeguard measures on the imports of certain steel
products and the related laws including Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974
and Section 311 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Implementation Act. The DSB established a single panel to include com-
plaints by other members such as the EC, Japan, China, Switzerland, Nor-
way,  New Zealand, and Brazil.81 In addition to most complainants that
reserved third-party rights, Taiwan, Cuba, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand,
Turkey, and Venezuela also participated as third parties in the proceeding.
On July 25, 2002, the director general composed the panel. Taiwan later de-
cided to become a more active participant and made an independent con-
sultation request with the United States on November 1, 2002.82
Concerning this U.S. Section 201 action, the Korean government made
the ﬁrst trade compensation request pursuant to Article 8 of the Agree-
ment on Safeguards.83 When the U.S. government did not agree on satis-
factory compensatory arrangements, several WTO members, such as the
EC,84 Japan,85 Norway,86 China,87 and Switzerland,88 notiﬁed to the Coun-
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79. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CDSOA FY2001 Disbursements Final,
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/import/add_cvd. On the other hand, it is noted that
only two ball bearing companies, Torrington and MPB (The Timken Company), received
more oﬀset payments in gross than Zenith Electronics in 2001. Their total disbursements
amount to $62.8 million and $25 million, respectively. But the disbursement for Zenith Elec-
tronics is the second largest one in terms of individual claims, following a $34.7 million oﬀset
payment for Torrington in relation to ball bearings dumping from Japan.
80. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CDSOA FY2002 Disbursements Final,
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/import/add_cvd/.
81. See WTO, WT/DS251/10, dated August 12, 2002.
82. See WTO, WT/DS274/1, dated November 11, 2002.
83. About 12 percent of trade remedy measures against Korean exports are safeguard ac-
tions. For example, as of December 31, 2002, Korean exporters are subject to ten safeguard
measures and ﬁve investigations in India, the United States, Venezuela, China, Argentina,
Canada, and EC. See the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) Summary
of Import Restrictions against Korean Exports 2002 (in Korean, December 2002).
84. See WTO, G/C/10, dated May 15, 2002.
85. See WTO, G/C/15, dated May 21, 2002.
86. See WTO, G/C/16, dated May 21, 2002.
87. See WTO, G/C/17, dated May 21, 2002.
88. See WTO, G/C/18, dated May 22, 2002.cil for Trade in Goods of proposed suspension of concessions. Instead of
proposing suspension of concessions, the Korean government notiﬁed the
Council for Trade in Goods of the agreement that the ninety-day period set
forth in Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX:3(a)
of the GATT shall be considered to expire on March 19, 2005.89 This
agreement to postpone potential retaliation for about three years, however,
practically wipes out all real impact on balancing trade interests, since the
original safeguard measure is supposed to end on March 20, 2005.90 In
other words, the Korean government tried to avoid the possibility of actu-
ally exercising the suspension of concession against one of its major trad-
ing partners without the DSB authorization, while it still maintained a po-
litical gesture that it exercised a legal authority speciﬁcally enunciated
under the Agreement on Safeguards.
On September 3, 2003, Korea brought a complaint regarding the EC’s
subsidy policy on shipbuilding industry. This complaint is basically in re-
taliation of the EC’s challenge against the Korean government’s role dur-
ing the ﬁnancial crisis in the shipbuilding industry.
Antidumping actions against Korea (from January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2002)
South United 
Argentina Australia EC India Africa States Others Total
AD initiation 9 11 21 18 13 19 54 145
AD measures 6 4 9 13 13 11 18 74
As described previously, Korea has had major problems regarding the
U.S. antidumping practices. In some sense, its experience as a complainant
in the WTO dispute settlement system almost exclusively against U.S. anti-
dumping practices is puzzling because, during the period of January 1,
1995 to June 20, 2002, it was the EC that initiated the most antidumping
investigations against exported products from Korea, and it was South
Africa and India that actually imposed the most antidumping measures.91
This fact seems to imply that the U.S. market still occupies an unbalanced
economic importance in Korea.92 Currently, Korea is actively engaged in
pushing the agenda to revise the Antidumping Agreement in the Doha De-
velopment Agenda.93
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89. See WTO, G/C/12, dated May 16, 2002. On the other hand, Australia, Brazil, and New
Zealand extended the deadline for retaliation to March 20, 2005. See WTO, G/C/11, dated
May 16, 2002 and G/C/13, 14, dated May 17, 2002.
90. See WTO, G/SG/N/10/USA/6, dated March 14, 2002.
91. See WTO, Statistics on Anti-dumping, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/
adp_e.htm.
92. On the other hand, Japan, a country with a similar trade structure and attitude toward
trade dispute settlement, has shown much diverse interest as a complainant concerning its tar-
get markets. See, generally, Iwasawa (2000).
93. For the Korean proposal regarding antidumping issues, see, for example, WTO, WT/
GC/W/235/Rev.1, dated July 12, 1999; TN/RL/W/6, dated April 26, 2002; and TN/RL/W/10,
dated June 28, 2002.For three cases in which the entire dispute settlement procedure, includ-
ing implementation, ended, the major problem Korea faced was the failure
to ensure prompt and eﬀective compliance by a respondent. The imple-
mentation for the US—DRAMS and US—Line Pipe cases was in fact not
much more than the mere expiration of the original trade remedy measures.
This result raises concern for eﬀectiveness and fairness of the WTO dispute
settlement system, especially when dealing with the WTO litigation de-
mands’ sizeable ﬁnancial and human resources. In particular, the lack of le-
gal systems to represent private parties’ interest in line with Section 301 and
TBR procedures would inevitably result in a less enthusiastic approach for
resorting to the legal activism for many WTO members, including Korea,
because government oﬃcials in charge of WTO disputes may not have an
incentive to initiate all those costly procedures merely for “paper” winning.
9.3.4 Philippines
The Philippines’ experience under the WTO dispute settlement system
showed a typical pattern for developing-country members with compara-
tive advantage in agricultural industry sectors. (See table 9.9.) Four com-
plaints against its trading partners were all regarding import restrictive
measures on agricultural products. In contrast, the Philippines were chal-
lenged twice concerning its own import barriers for industrial sectors, al-
though it was also challenged once about import restriction on pork and
poultry from the United States.
9.3.5 Thailand
Thailand is in some sense unique in the manner that they use the WTO
dispute settlement system. Thailand is currently the most active develop-
ing-country complainant in the WTO. Whereas Thailand was challenged
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Table 9.9 WTO disputes involving the Philippines
As complainant
Brazil—Measures Aﬀecting Desiccated Coconut DS22 P/AB report
United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products DS61 In consultation
Australia—Certain Measures Aﬀecting the Importation of 
Fresh Fruit and Vegetables DS270 In panel
Australia—Certain Measures Aﬀecting the Importation of 
Fresh Pineapple DS271 In consultation
As respondent
Philippines—Measures Aﬀecting Pork and Poultry DS74, 
DS102/US Mutually resolved
Philippines—Measures Aﬀecting Trade and Investment in the 
Motor Vehicle Sector DS195/US In panel
Philippines—Antidumping Measures Regarding Polypropylene 
Resins from Korea DS215/Korea In consultation
Note: See table 9.7 note.only once so far by Poland concerning antidumping measures, it made ten
consultation requests against other WTO members. The EC has been the
most frequent target of Thailand’s complaints. Other than the EC, Thai-
land’s complaints were raised against various countries, including Colom-
bia, Egypt, Hungary, Turkey, and the United States. It is noted that Thai-
land’s complaints are often raised against other developing countries. In
terms of subject matters, Thailand’s dispute settlement experience also
showed a typical pattern of developing countries by focusing mostly on
foreign trade barriers on agricultural and textile products. (See table 9.10.)
9.3.6 Others
No WTO member has raised a formal complaint against China or Tai-
wan yet, although they joined the WTO more than a year and a half ago.
(See table 9.11.) This does not mean that trade policy measures of both
members are completely consistent with the WTO disciplines. In fact, as
many members are concerned, these two members with substantial trade
volumes may still maintain numerous potentially controversial measures
or laws, especially considering the short experience on multilateral trade
disciplines. Although it is true that both members have exerted strenuous
eﬀorts to bring their system into conformity with the WTO system, more
dispute cases concerning both members seem unavoidable for the future
WTO dispute settlement system. In particular, the Chinese government
has been very active in using trade remedy measures to protect domestic
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Table 9.10 WTO disputes involving Thailand
As complainant
EC—Duties on Imports of Rice DS17 Inactive
Hungary—Export Subsidies in Respect to Agricultural  DS35 Mutually resolved
Products
Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing  DS47 In consultation
Products
United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and  DS58 P/AB report
Shrimp Products
Colombia—Safeguard Measure on Imports of Plain Polyester  DS181 Inactive
Filaments from Thailand
Egypt—Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil DS205 In consultation
United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Oﬀset Act of  DS217 P/AB report
2000
EC—Generalized System of Preferences DS242 In consultation
EC—Export Subsidies on Sugar DS283 In consultation
EC—Customs Classiﬁcation of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts DS286 In consultation
As respondent
Thailand—Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes, and Sections  DS122/Poland P/AB report
of Iron or Nonalloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland
Note: See table 9.7 note.import markets.94Some of these measures may not be free from WTO chal-
lenges in the future. (See table 9.12.)
Another interesting question is whether and how China would deal with
Taiwan in terms of the WTO dispute settlement system. In case Taiwan
raises a complaint against China and seeks to proceed to panel and the
Appellate Body proceedings, there is no mechanism to block such proce-
dures under the WTO dispute settlement system.95 It would bring about a
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Table 9.11 WTO disputes as complainants
China
United States—Deﬁnitive Safeguard Measures on Imports  DS252 In AB
of Certain Steel Products
Taiwan
United States—Deﬁnitive Safeguard Measures on Imports  DS274 In consultation
of Certain Steel Products
Hong Kong, China
Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing  DS29 In consultation
Products
Indonesia
Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear DS123 In consultation
United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Oﬀset Act  DS217 P/AB report
of 2000
Malaysia
United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and  DS58 P/AB report
Shrimp Products
Singapore
Malaysia—Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and  DS1 Inactive
Polypropylene
Note: See table 9.7 note.
94. Up to the end of April 2003, the Chinese authority initiated twenty-one antidumping
investigations. Among them, seventeen cases involved Korean products.
95. Under the GATT system, a respondent could block the proceeding by declining con-
sensus for panel establishment. This was changed under the WTO dispute settlement system
that mandates panel proceedings, if requested by a complainant, after a sixty-day consulta-
tion period. For more detailed accounts on the WTO dispute settlement proceedings, see,
generally, Waincymer (2002).
Table 9.12 WTO disputes as respondents
Indonesia
Indonesia—Certain Measures Aﬀecting the Automobile  DS54, DS64/Japan  P/AB report
Industry DS55/EC, DS59/US
Malaysia
Malaysia—Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and  DS1/Singapore Inactive
Polypropylene
Note: See table 9.7 note.diplomatically sensitive situation in which China and Taiwan stand against
each other with equivalent status in an international forum, which may
cause a very diﬃcult political dilemma for these members. Because the
WTO is the only international organization of which Taiwan is a full mem-
ber, Taiwan may have strong incentives to use the WTO dispute settlement
system to promote the image as a political entity that is on par with China
(Kong 2002). It remains to be seen how these members will agree to address
this problem.
9.4 East Asia in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) Negotiation
The DSU review mandated by a 1994 Ministerial Decision started in the
DSB in 1997. The deadline stipulated as January 1, 1999 was extended to
July 31, 1999, but there was no agreement by then. In November 2001, at
the Doha Ministerial Conference, member governments agreed to negoti-
ate to improve and clarify the DSU and conclude the negotiation not later
than May 2003.
East Asian members have actively participated in various areas of the
Doha negotiations, including reforming the dispute settlement system. In
addition to Japan, Korea, and Thailand, who have often resorted to the
WTO dispute settlement system, China and Taiwan are also making sub-
stantial contributions by submitting their own proposals to the DSU ne-
gotiation.
Although they have shown diﬀerent emphases on varying issues, their
proposals invariably try to enhance eﬃciency and transparency of the dis-
pute settlement mechanism, particularly with respect to the implementa-
tion phase of the current procedure. For example, Japan and Korea sub-
mitted elaborated proposals concerning Articles 21 and 22. The proposal
by Japan includes a detailed provision for compliance panel procedures.96
Korea proposed that the compliance panel proceed to determine the level
of the nulliﬁcation or impairment and, if the Appellate Body modiﬁed or
reversed the legal ﬁndings and conclusions of the compliance panel, the
Appellate Body determine the ﬁnal level of the nulliﬁcation or impair-
ment.97
China suggested augmentation of special and diﬀerential treatment in
the DSU to developing-country members, including the least-developed
countries.98 Claiming that China is a developing-country member, China
proposed that developed-country members exercise due restraint in cases
against developing-country members. In other words, developed-country
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96. See WTO, TN/DS/W/32, dated January 22, 2003.
97. See WTO, TN/DS/W/35, dated January 22, 2003.
98. See WTO, TN/DS/W/57, dated May 19, 2003.members shall not bring more than two cases to the WTO DSB against a
particular developing-country member in one calendar year. Moreover,
while time periods applicable under the DSU for dealing with disputes in-
volving safeguard and antidumping measures shall be half of the normal
time frame, the shortened time frame shall not apply to the defending party
that is a developing-country member.
Taiwan made extensive proposals to improve third-party rights in the
WTO dispute settlement procedures.99But Taiwan opposed some of the pro-
posals made by other members such as the opening of meetings to the pub-
lic, public access to submissions, and developing guideline procedures for
the handling of amicus curiae submissions.100
Malaysia made an interesting proposal concerning litigation costs.101 It
proposed that in a dispute involving a developing-country member and a
developed-country member as a complaining party and as a party com-
plained against, respectively, and where that dispute does not end with a
panel or the Appellate Body ﬁnding against the former, the panel or the
Appellate Body award litigation costs to the developing-country member
to the tune of US$500,000 or actual expenses, whichever is higher.102 The
litigation costs shall include lawyers’ fees, charges and all other expenses
for preparation of necessary documents103 and participation in the consul-
tations, panel, and Appellate Body proceedings. The litigation costs shall
also include travel, hotel, per diem, and other expenses for a reasonable
number of the capital-based oﬃcials. In fact, litigation costs to deal with
WTO disputes have become one of the most serious practical obstacles to
utilize the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Since private attorneys
were permitted to panel and Appellate Body proceedings in early WTO
years, their roles have quickly become indispensable elements of WTO lit-
igations, probably except for a handful of members. The legal expenses to
procure such professional lawyers turned out, however, to be sometimes
way beyond the scope of budgetary constraints of developing countries.
These problems led some WTO members to establish the Advisory Centre
on WTO Law on October 5, 2001. Currently, Hong Kong, the Philippines,
and Thailand are signatories to the Centre. Thailand suggested that the
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99. See WTO, TN/DS/W/36, dated January 22, 2003.
100. See WTO, TN/DS/W/25, dated November 27, 2002.
101. See WTO, TN/DS/W/47, dated February 11, 2003.
102. The expenses shall be calculated for each stage of dispute settlement proceedings,
which include consultation, panel, and the Appellate Body proceedings as well as the pro-
ceedings under Articles 21.3(c), 21.5, 22.6, and 25 of the DSU. The original panel and the
panel established pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU shall take into account the expenses re-
lating to the consultations preceding those panel proceedings for award of litigation costs.
The award of litigation costs is binding on the parties and not subject to appeal.
103. The documents include request for consultations, oral or written submissions, and all
other documents necessary for preparation and participation in the dispute settlement pro-
ceedings. They shall also include oral or written advice rendered prior to, during, or after con-
sultations, panel, or the Appellate Body proceedings relating to the dispute.Appellate Body be composed of nine persons, three of whom serve on any
one case.104Furthermore, it proposed a new panel composition process, in-
cluding a Roster of Panel Chairs comprising individuals who may be ap-
pointed as chair of a panel by lot.105
At its meeting on July 24, 2003, the General Council of the WTO agreed
to extend negotiations in the DSB special session that is reviewing DSU.
The time frame was extended from May 31, 2003 to May 31, 2004. How
many proposals to improve the DSU can actually be agreed upon by mem-
bers by May 2004 remains to be seen.
9.5 National Complaining Procedures for Private Parties
The WTO dispute settlement system is primarily for member govern-
ments. In other words, private parties may not be able to bring complaints
directly to the WTO dispute settlement system even if it is indeed private
parties that are aggrieved by WTO inconsistent measures of other WTO
members. Those private parties have to persuade their own governments to
raise complaints on behalf of their economic interests. This mechanism
does not, however, function properly, as the discretionary decision of
member governments on whether to bring a WTO complaint often does
not stand in line with private parties’ requests. Since the WTO agreement
is not normally directly applicable, the lack of systemic nexus between the
WTO dispute settlement system and private parties causes fundamental
problems in the WTO system. This problem becomes more and more seri-
ous as the scope of the WTO system tends to expand by encompassing in-
trinsically private legal issues such as investment and competition.
Currently, the most notable examples of linking private parties to the
WTO dispute settlement system are the Section 301 mechanism of the
United States and the Trade Barriers Regulation system of the EC. Even if
the unilateral retaliation has been the focal point of the Section 301, the
most important aspect of the Section 301 mechanism in terms of trade pol-
icy is the establishment of the systemic procedures under which private
parties can force the government to act on their petitions. The EC initially
introduced the so-called New Trade Policy Instrument by Regulation 2641/
84,106 but substantially modiﬁed it pursuant to the WTO Agreement and
adopted the TBR system.107 In both the United States and the EC, many
WTO complaints have been indeed initiated by petitions under those sys-
tems.
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104. See WTO, TN/DS/W/30, dated January 22, 2003.
105. See WTO, TN/DS/W/31, dated January 22, 2003.
106. See Council Regulation (EEC) no. 2641/84 of September 17, 1984.
107. See Council Regulation (EC) no. 3286/94 of December 22, 1994. For a thorough
overview of the TBR, see Bronckers (1997).Despite the rather long history and experience under the multilateral
trade system, Japan and Korea have not yet prepared such mechanisms in
domestic legal or institutional systems. Most other East Asian countries
do not have such systems either. Interestingly, China prepared a TBR-like
system that would allow private parties to raise complaints against foreign
trade barriers under systemic procedures and, in turn, lead to formal WTO
complaints by the Chinese government. The Provisional Regulations for
Investigation on Foreign Trade Barriers enacted from November 1, 2002
stipulates that natural or legal persons representing domestic industries, as
well as domestic industries or companies, can apply for investigations. The
investigation procedure under this regulation may not exceed six months
and may be extended to nine months in exceptional circumstances. Article
29 provides that the Ministry of Commerce (previously, the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation [MOFTEC]) may take one of
the following, if foreign trade barriers are found to be in violation of inter-
national agreements: (a) bilateral consultation, (b) multilateral dispute
settlement, or (c) other necessary measures. Although the current provi-
sions do not exclude unilateral retaliation by taking “other necessary mea-
sures,” the overall structure of the system is much more focused in con-
necting the WTO dispute settlement system and aggrieved domestic
private parties. This development should give important lessons for other
WTO members in general and East Asian members in particular.
9.6 Conclusion
The WTO dispute settlement system has become the core of the world
trading system. Various trade disputes arising from divergent interpreta-
tion of the WTO agreements and de facto discriminatory impact of the do-
mestic trade policy measures have been rectiﬁed by the legal rulings of the
WTO panels and Appellate Body. Yet, there is huge discrepancy among the
WTO members, especially in East Asia, in the degree of utilizing the WTO
dispute settlement system. Moreover, East Asian members have shown a
strong tendency in settling the disputes rather than litigating the cases. This
fact should not be construed to indicate that the WTO dispute settlement
system has been malfunctioning to represent the legitimate WTO rights
and interests in East Asia. To the contrary, it is shown that major economic
sectors—industrial or agricultural—of East Asian members have been
able to use the WTO dispute settlement system for securing a level playing
ﬁeld. The next question for these members may be how to establish the do-
mestic system to properly represent their private economic interests in a
more balanced manner and how to make the WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem a benign instrument for the entire economy, not a captive tool by a par-
ticular segment of industries.
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Comment Da-Nien Liu
This is an interesting paper, providing much valuable information on
World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement cases in the East
Asia economies and greatly increasing the understanding of the participa-
tion of East Asia economies in the WTO dispute settlement system. Pro-
fessor Ahn has done a thoroughly professional job in analyzing these Dis-
pute Settlement Body (DSB) cases; most of the cases referred to in this
article concern Japan and Korea because, for other East Asian countries,
including Taiwan, DSB is a relatively new trade policy mechanism. I be-
lieve that there are valuable lessons to be learned from the experiences of
these two countries; therefore, my comments are largely devoted to raising
additional considerations and to questioning the areas in which more work
could be done in the future.
I have four comments, the ﬁrst of which is related to the issue of Japan as
a complainant and a third party, while the second refers to a DSB case on
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages in Korea (the Korea-soju case, DS75 and
DS84). The third question is related to the national complaint procedures
for private parties, while the ﬁnal question is on the subject of future
amendments to the DSU in the East Asia economies.
First of all, as mentioned in the paper, the attitude of the Japanese gov-
ernment changed after 1998, when more DSB cases were initiated, and it
is also noteworthy that Japan is now one of the most active third parties
in WTO dispute settlement cases, where it has shown a strong interest in
those cases concerning measures by the U.S. government. Here it may be
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tion for Economic Research.more interesting to learn the overall strategy of Japan regarding its DSB
participation. Why would Japan, with its abundant resources and consid-
erable experience in dispute settlement cases, choose to be an active third
party? In particular, why should any country that has a substantial interest
in certain cases choose to be a third party rather than a party to the dis-
pute? As we know, a third party in dispute settlement cases does not need
to spend considerable time, eﬀort, and money in bringing a complaint
to the panel, and it can also attend the ﬁrst meeting of the panel where it
can present its own views (with the exception of conﬁdential information
hearings). Most important, if it stands alongside the plaintiﬀ, which sub-
sequently wins the suit, it can also enjoy the beneﬁts of the case on a most-
favored nation (MFN) basis (if the respondent complies with the recom-
mendations or rulings of the DSB). For a new WTO member, such as
Taiwan, being a third party in a case is an appropriate way of gaining experi-
ence, while spending relatively little as it learns to further integrate itself
into the multilateral trading system.
Second, in section 9.3.3, Professor Ahn refers to the Korea-sojucase not-
ing that “by experiencing the impact of the WTO dispute settlement deci-
sions, probably at the deepest and widest level of daily life, this case has
played a crucial role in enhancing WTO awareness in Korea.” After losing
the case, Korea was forced to amend the Liquor Tax Law and the Educa-
tion Tax Law, that is, to increase the tax rate on sojuin order to comply with
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
I believe that this is a very important issue because Taiwan was faced
with a similarly diﬃcult situation when it amended its regulations on to-
bacco and wine, leading to a signiﬁcant increase in the tax rate on rice wine
so as to comply with the national treatment principle of the WTO. Many
people in Taiwan could not accept the result because they had enjoyed low
tax rates on rice wine for decades, and many of these people continued to
believe that rice wine was only for cooking, not for drinking. However, the
United States did not accept this point, and, as a result, many people com-
plained of the Taiwanese government’s failure in its trade negotiations with
the United States, leading to a fundamental misunderstanding and nega-
tive impression of the WTO. It would be interesting to see how a govern-
ment can succeed in educating its people with regard to DSB outcomes and
help to provide a better understanding of WTO principles. I believe that
this is important, for both Korea and Taiwan, and I expect that Professor
Ahn could provide the East Asian economies with the ﬁne details of some
Korean experiences.
The third point relates to the issue of national complaint procedures for
private parties. The paper notes that China was the ﬁrst country in East
Asia to implement a trade barriers regulation (TBR)-like system that
would allow private parties to raise complaints against foreign trade barri-
ers under systemic procedures, which would in turn lead to formal WTO
324 Dukgeun Ahncomplaints by the government; this is the so-called Provisional Regula-
tions for the Investigation on Foreign Trade Barriers, which was enacted
on November 1, 2002. It is also very interesting to consider the motivation
behind China’s application of this system. My question relates to whether,
if the government concerned rejects the application of a private enterprise
to raise a complaint, the private enterprise in question will have the right to
appeal the government’s decision through some administrative or judicial
procedure based on an allegation that the discretionary decision of the
government concerned is at odds with the interests of private parties. I
think that this is also a very important point in assessing the functionality
of the system.
Finally, I suggest that the paper could add more on the role that East
Asia can play in future DSB negotiations. Although the DSB failed to
complete its negotiations for amendments to the DSU before the end of
May 2003, as mandated by the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the chair-
man of the DSB did present many proposals at the end of May.1
The following issues are also of considerable importance: improvements
to third party rights, clariﬁcation of the controversy between the compen-
sation and retaliation amendment of the “reasonable period of time,” im-
provements to the implementation of the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB, remand procedures of panel reports, and special considerations
for developing countries (special and diﬀerential [S&D] treatments). All of
these issues could have an impact on the East Asia countries in their appli-
cation of the DSB mechanism and should call for further study. In partic-
ular I feel that the issues of compensation and retaliation, and the special
treatment of developing-country members, are of signiﬁcant importance.
Comment John Whalley
This is an extremely interesting paper that carefully documents World
Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement cases primarily involving
Japan, Korea, and Thailand since 1994 when, as part of the Uruguay
Round decision and the relabeling of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs
and Trade (GATT) as the WTO, major changes took place in dispute
settlement procedures. These included consensus to reject over consensus
to accept, time limits for various stages of proceedings, a permanent roster
of panelists, and an appellate procedure. Prior to 1994, East Asian in-
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and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.volvement in GATT dispute settlement was extremely limited and prima-
rily involved cases against Japan. Japan in those years used GATT dispute
settlement little in attempting to deal with problems of access and repeated
violations of their GATT rights in North American and European mar-
kets. Professor Ahn shows how three leading East Asian traders are now
much more aggressively pursuing WTO dispute settlement than before but
(as table 9.5 shows) still far less aggressively than major non-Asian WTO
members.
Relatively little, to my knowledge, has been written on the East Asian
experience with WTO dispute settlement, and so this is a welcome contri-
bution. Also, in my opinion, economists have relatively little to say in gen-
eral about mechanisms for the enforcement of international legal arrange-
ments, because if one accepts the folk theorem sets of trigger strategies
rather than agreed procedures for the resolution of disputes should sup-
port international agreements. Let me further say, in passing, that the
WTO itself (which is now really more of a World Everything but Trade Or-
ganization (WT –O; environment, IP, labor standards, etc.) or a World Time
and Trade Organization (WTTO; with the inclusion of intertemporal in-
termediation services such as banking) poses myriad paradoxes for econo-
mists. Why is global policy bargaining only conﬁned to trade policy (which
it now of course is not since the WTO is really the World Bargaining Or-
ganization)? Why are there no side payments? Why is bargaining con-
strained by agreed prior rules, such as MFN, which seemingly forgo gains
from bargaining? And many more....  
I will concentrate my remarks on three questions not posed directly by
Professor Ahn but implicit in his discussion. Why such limited use of dis-
pute settlement by East Asian economies prior to 1994? Why is there an el-
evation in use after? And is it really true, as he suggests, that the post-1994
system is an improvement?
Why such limited use of dispute settlement by East Asians prior to 1994?
I believe there is no simple or single answer to this question; instead, nu-
merous factors enter. The GATT as it evolved from 1947 through 1957
(Treaty of Rome) was de facto more of a bilateral European Union (EU)
U.S. accommodation in which other parties participated through MFN
guaranteeing each of the two major parties (the United States and the EU)
access rights to agreements the other negotiated. The trading system never
was and still is not an arrangement between entities of equal size. And
given this, most early disputes were inevitably EU-United States. Add to
this the enormous cultural diﬀerences as far as legal systems and trans-
parency in policy are concerned between the Asia economies and the EU
and the United States, and the strategic interest in both Japan and Korea
in maintaining security arrangements with non-Asian partners at the ex-
pense of trade redress and, in my view, key factors are exposed.
Why the increase in use post-1994? Clearly the change in WTO arrange-
326 Dukgeun Ahnments play some role as panels are automatic, and panel rulings can no
longer be blocked. But there is more. One factor is the changed role and
proﬁle of legal arrangements generally in East Asia; another is the wider
and more active country participation in WTO process; and yet another is
the weakening of security considerations.
Is the post-1994 WTO process for resolving disputes really an improve-
ment? Most WTO scholars seem to think so. Panels are eﬀectively auto-
matic, and panel rulings cannot be blocked. But as the late Bob Hudec so
often documented, the overload of WTO cases and resulting impacts on
the quality of WTO jurisprudence are major sources of concern. Added to
these is the clear proliferation in panels as time limits for one panel process
attempting to resolve a dispute spawn new and more panels (as happened
in the Banana’s case). True, there are no longer the ten-year-old delays as
in the EU-US DISC case in the 1970s, but if parties with power do not ac-
cept panel rulings as fair and balanced and time limits are used to force
their legal acceptance, further political (and eventually new legal) conﬂict
ensues (as has happened).
Where are the East Asians headed in all this? My own view is into major
conﬂict. The terms of China’s WTO accession (especially in services such
as banking) are breathtaking and may not be able to be implemented by
2007, inviting WTO dispute process and retaliation. If the Multiﬁber Ar-
rangement (MFA) is replaced in 2005 by some new set of trade restricting
measures against apparel in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD)-fresh WTO, conﬂict might well ensue, and the
East Asians will be at the heart of this. How they use and foster dispute
settlement may be key to their trade interests.
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